

Sann, Charles

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WD0488

From: Charles Sann [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 12:31 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in KS

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

1| 24.4 | I support this project being grounded in my home state. I think it is wonderful that you are considering us.
Thank you

Sawyer, Kathleen**Page 1 of 1**

WD0774

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 4:17 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NO TO NBAF IN ATHENS

THERE ARE MANY VIEWS TO THE IDEA OF HAVING, OR NOT HAVING THIS FACILITY IN THE ATHENS AREA.

1| 5.2 | AFTER READING AND HEARING BOTH SIDES, IT SIMPLY MAKES NO SENSE TO LOCATE IT HERE.

2| 5.1 | IT SEEMS THE BEST PLACE IS TO LEAVE IT ON PLUM ISLAND, WHERE IS HAS BEEN FOR SOME TIME.

THANK YOU,
KATHLEEN SAWYER

It's only a deal if it's where you want to go. Find your travel deal here.
(<http://information.travel.aol.com/deals?ncid=aoltrv00050000000047>)

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for Plum Island Site Alternative.

Scarborough, Jackie

Page 1 of 1

WD0224

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, August 10, 2008 12:52 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF facility in Athens-Clarke County GA

1|25.2 | This is to state unequivocally that I do not want this
2|5.0 | facility to be located in Athens-Clarke County,
3|12.2 | Georgia. I was born and raised in this community
4| | [REDACTED]. From all I have been
5| | told and researched, a facility of this type does not
6| | belong in the smallest county in Georgia much less
7| | next to one of its largest universities. It needs to be
8| | on an island somewhere. I see no benefit to our
9| | community if this facility locates here and there is
10| | nothing that will change my mind. Just the effect on
11| | the local and surrounding environment alone is
12| | enough to say NO. Not to mention we have been in a
13| | drought for 6 years and are still fighting its effects.
14| | It's not over yet.

1 cont. |
25.2 | STAY OUT!!!

Jackie Scarborough
[REDACTED] GA
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement that NBAF should be located on an island. The NBAF EIS fully analyzes the Plum Island Site Alternative. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS evaluate the potential effects on health and safety of operating the NBAF at the six site alternatives. The evaluation concludes that a pathogen release at the Plum Island Site would be slightly less likely to result in adverse effects than the mainland sites.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1, the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water approximately 0.76% of Athens 15.5 million gallons per day usage.

Scarritt, Richard**Page 1 of 1****WD0403**

From: Scarritt, Richard [rscarritt@spencerfane.com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 10:57 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Kansas

1|24.4 | For many reasons, NBAF belongs in Kansas on the merits due to the state's unique ability to protect America's food supply and the agriculture economy.

RWS
816.474.8100
rscarritt@spencerfane.com

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Schager, Roxann

Page 1 of 1

WD0505

From: Roxann Schager [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 2:23 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NO bio lab in North Carolina!!

I understand that I should send comments on the proposed National Bio Agro Defense Facility to this email address.

1| 25.3

I **do not** want the National Bio Agro Defense Facility in North Carolina at all. You cannot ensure this facility will be safe and you should not risk my family and friends lives by placing this facility in North Carolina.

How can you even pretend to have security under control after the anthrax letters fiasco??

Roxann Schager

[REDACTED], NC [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative based on safety concerns. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

Schelp, John

Page 1 of 1

WD0357

From: John Schelp [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 1:39 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: opposition to NBAF site in Butner, NC

1/25.3 | I write in opposition to the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility in Butner, NC.

The EIS left too many unanswered questions and was vague on site-specific issues.

thank you listening to the community,

John Schelp
[REDACTED], NC

Note: the opinions expressed here are mine alone and do not necessarily represent those of any organization or my employer.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Schmidt, David

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WD0310

From: Dave Schmidt [schmidt@cis.ksu.edu]
Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2008 8:06 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Comments on the NBAF Draft Environmental Impact Statement

Dear Madam/Sir,

I have examined the NBAF Draft Environmental Impact Statement.

- 1|15.4 | I realize that the placement of the facility in my community
(Manhattan, KS) would yield substantial economic benefits to my town,
my University, the academic department where I work, and possibly
2|21.4 | to me personally as well. Yet, the Impact Statement notes that
the facility poses a "moderate risk" to the area.
- 3|25.4 | Given my community's location in the middle of an agricultural industry
that is critical to my state's livelihood, I cannot support
the lab's location here.

Sincerely,

David Schmidt,
University Distinguished Professor
and Tointon Chair of Engineering
Kansas State University
Manhattan, KS

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's opinion. The economic effects of construction and operation of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative are included in Section 3.10.4 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the siting, construction and operation of the NBAF at the [insert proper site name]. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative. DHS notes the commentor's views on risk. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen.

Schmidt, Linda

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PD0081

August 15, 2008

- 1|25.4 This is Linda Schmidt in [REDACTED], Kansas and I am calling in regard to the Manhattan, Kansas site. I am opposed to the NBAF being situated in Manhattan for the following reasons.
- 2|21.4 First of all, I think there is a higher risk of accidental release here in Kansas because we have extremely severe storms and tornados that I am not sure a building could withstand.
- The other reason I am opposed is that if there were an accidental release of pathogens, it would put at risk area livestock, the livelihood of the area farmers. It would affect the food supply as well as the wildlife of the state.
- 3|5.0 The third reason I am opposed to the NBAF being at the Manhattan site is that the GAO report showed that this was not the most satisfactory area for it to be located in, anyway.
- And last of all, I would like to say that I am opposed to the NBAF being placed on the mainland. I think it is worth the government's expense to keep the facility on Plum Island and to update the facility there to handle these pathogens.
- 4|5.1 Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents,, external events, and intentional acts. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site. The basis for establishing the anticipated wind speeds were the International Building Code, ASCE 7 and the local jurisdictions. However, because of code specified building importance modification factors and normal factors of safety incorporated into the structural design, the facility would resist wind pressures up to 170% of the code specified 50-year wind pressures. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first, and this breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. The loss of these architectural wall components would decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building and therefore diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Even with the failure of these interior and exterior wall systems under an extreme wind loading event, the robust construction used to construct BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces, reinforced cast-in-place concrete walls, would resist these wind forces and the primary bio-containment envelope would not be breached. The containment walls will be designed to withstand a 200 mph wind load, which is equivalent to an F3 tornado according to the FEMA Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters standards.

The economic impact of an accidental release is presented in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. While the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, DHS acknowledges that the possible economic effect would be significant for all sites. The economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss of \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies

and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area, to include agricultural livestock. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. Emergency response plans will include the current USDA emergency response plan for foot and mouth disease (FMD) which includes compensation for livestock losses.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated on the mainland. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS show that even though the Plum Island Site has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.1

The proposed NBAF requires BSL-4 capability to meet mission requirements (DHS and USDA). PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory or animal space, and the existing PIADC facilities are inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory. Upgrading the existing facilities to allow PIADC to meet the current mission would be more costly than building the NBAF on Plum Island, as discussed in Section 2.4.1 of the NBAF EIS

Schriber, Gary**Page 1 of 1****PD0063**

August 13, 2008

1| 5.0

This is Gary Schriber from Soldier, Kansas. I'm very disappointed that anybody would want to put something like this in the middle of our Nation. It is a big mistake. I believe any time you're dealing with any type of infectious disease it needs to be in a place where it can be isolated if there is a mistake. Humans make mistakes. It doesn't make any difference how careful they are. There was mistakes in Great Britain. There's been mistakes on Plum Island. It needs to stay in the isolated area of Plum Island. It does not need to be in the center of our continent where it can spread if there is a mistake.

2| 25.4 | Please don't put it in Manhattan, Kansas, or Mississippi or any place else on the
3| 25.5 | continent.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 show that even though the Plum Island Site has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.5

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Schuley, Marcia

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WD0306

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2008 12:01 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: No NBAF in Manhattan KS

1|25.4; I would like to register my opposition to placing the NBAF in Manhattan,
2|21.4; KS. The natural disasters and prevalence of livestock in our area place
1 cont.| place too high a risk to having the facility here. Please put my in the
25.4 'opposed' category. Thank you
Marcia Schuley

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

Schultes, Ida

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PD0103

August 19, 2008

Yes,

1|25.4 I am Ida Schultes. I live at [REDACTED], Kansas. I'm a retired DAC. I live on a farm and there is nothing more dangerous, that I can see, than putting NBAF in Manhattan.

2|5.0 This is on the campus and these are horrible diseases and the very least they could do is put it somewhere safe. Now the one out in New Mexico wouldn't be real bad at all, because I've been there and I know what that's like. But if they want to move it, for goodness sakes, don't put it out here on a college campus where we have hundreds, and hundreds and hundreds of our young people.

Bye, bye.

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

DHS held a competitive process to select potential sites for the proposed NBAF as described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. A team of federal employees representing multi-department component offices and multi-governmental agencies (i.e., DHS, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Department of Health and Human Services) reviewed the submissions based primarily on environmental suitability and proximity to research capabilities, proximity to workforce, acquisition/construction/operations, and community acceptance. Ultimately, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed others in meeting the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences, and determined that they, in addition to the Plum Island Site, would be evaluated in the EIS as alternatives for the proposed NBAF.

Schwartz, Robert**Page 1 of 6****WD0846**

From: Rob Schwartz [rob@trivalleycares.org]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 8:04 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF DEIS Comments
Attachments: NBAF DEIS Comments.doc; AP article - Biodefense lab looks headed to Mississippi.pdf; 052208.OI.hrg.Stupak.BSLabs.pdf; GAO Report - High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories-DHS Lacks Evidence to Conclude That Foot-and-Mouth Disease Research Can Be Done Safely on the U.S.Mainland.pdf

Dear Mr. James V. Johnson,

I have attached Tri-Valley CAREs' comments on the NBAF DEIS to this email. Please note that I have also attached three other documents, which are referenced in our comments and must also be included in the administrative record. Also, please confirm receipt of this email and the attachments. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,
Robert Schwartz

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Robert Schwartz
Staff Attorney
Tri-Valley CAREs
2582 Old First Street
Livermore, CA 94551
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Schwartz, Robert

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WD0846

August 25, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
 Science and Technology Directorate
 James V. Johnson
 Mail Stop #2100
 245 Murray Lane, SW
 Building 410
 Washington, DC 20528

Re: Comments on the NBAF DEIS

To Whom It May Concern:

Tri-Valley CAREs (TVC) is a non-profit organization founded in 1983 by Livermore, California area residents to research and conduct public education and advocacy regarding the potential environmental, health and proliferation impacts of the Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. On behalf of our 5,600 members, Tri-Valley CAREs submits the following comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF).

I. The proliferation of high-containment biosafety laboratories

1| 2.0

The federal government must undertake an overall assessment of the present U.S. capability and need for high-containment biosafety laboratories and related facilities prior to authorizing the construction and operation of any such facilities, including the proposed NBAF. Since the anthrax mailings in late 2001, the U.S. government "has spent or allocated nearly \$50 billion among 11 federal departments and agencies to address the threat of biological weapons."¹ According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), these expenditures have led to a "major proliferation" of Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) and Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) facilities "across many sectors—federal, academic, state, and private—and all over the United States."² Alarming, the GAO has reported:

No single federal agency has the mission and, therefore, is accountable for tracking the number of all BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs within the United States. Moreover, although several agencies have a need to know the number and location of these labs to support their missions, no agency knows how many such labs there are in the United States or their locations Therefore, no agency is responsible for determining the aggregate risks associated with the expansion of these labs.³

¹ Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Fiscal Year 2009 Federal Funding for Bioweapons Prevention and Defense, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/biochem/articles/f09_biodefense_funding/ (last visited August 25, 2008).

² GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE OVERSIGHT OF THE PROLIFERATION OF BSL-3 AND BSL-4 LABORATORIES IN THE UNITED STATES, Highlights (2007).

³ *Id.* at 7.

TVC'S NBAF DEIS COMMENTS

1

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

As described in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's mission is to study foreign animal, zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) and emerging diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The NBAF would enable research on the transmission of these animal diseases and support development of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies for foreign animal, zoonotic and emerging diseases. By proposing to construct the NBAF, DHS is following policy direction established by the Congress and the President.

Schwartz, Robert

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WD0846

- 2| 21.0 Because there is a baseline risk—attributable to human error—associated with any high-containment laboratory, the proliferation of these facilities has increased the risk to human health and the environment, particularly with regard to “new labs with less experience[.]” such as the proposed NBAF.⁴ For this reason, among others, Congressmen John D. Dingell and Bart Stupak, who are both members of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, recently sent a letter to President Bush, urging him to “order the suspension of all further design and construction” of all federal government-run or –sponsored BSL-4 and BSL-4 laboratories in the U.S.⁵ In their letter, the Congressmen noted that the preliminary findings of their investigation of these facilities “indicate there appears to have been no overall planning to justify the massive increase in the construction of these labs since 2001”; and, as a result, the Congressmen determined “that many of the labs are probably unnecessary or redundant.”⁶ Accordingly, the federal government should undertake a comprehensive and government-wide assessment of the present capability and need for high-containment biosafety laboratories and related facilities in the United States. Until this assessment is complete, DHS should not proceed with the construction and operation of the proposed NBAF.

II. Alternatives

- 3| 4.0 By neglecting to identify its preferred alternative, DHS has inhibited public participation in the NEPA process. According to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the alternatives section of an EIS “is the heart of the environmental impact statement.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1978). Pursuant to CEQ’s regulations implementing NEPA, agencies are required to “[i]dentify the agency’s preferred alternative or alternatives, if one or more exists, in the draft statement and identify such alternative in the final statement unless another law prohibits the expression of such a preference.” *Id.* at § 1502.14(c). Here, DHS has failed to “[e]ncourage and facilitate public involvement” in the NBAF decision-making process because the public must guess as to which of the alternatives will be DHS’ preferred alternative. *Id.* at § 1500.2(d). Of necessity, most members of the public confronted with a voluminous document such as the draft DEIS will direct their comments to the preferred alternative and subsidiary issues, particularly where the difference between the alternatives is principally geographic in nature, as it is here. DHS’ obfuscation in this regard has rendered that commonsense approach impossible. Instead, in violation of CEQ’s regulations, DHS has “amass[ed] needless detail[.]” where it should have “concentrate[d] on the issues that are truly significant to the action in question,” namely the reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts of DHS’ preferred alternative. *Id.* at 1500.1(b).

- 4| 5.0 Moreover, the entire site selection process appears to have been prejudiced. According to a recent report, DHS “swept aside evaluations of government experts and named Mississippi—home to powerful U.S. lawmakers with sway over the agency—as a top location for [the proposed NBAF].”⁷ According to the DEIS for the proposed NBAF, sites were evaluated according to criteria that included DHS’ preferences that “[t]he proposed site be within a comprehensive research community that has existing research programs in areas related to NBAF mission requirements” and that “[t]he proposed site be within proximity to skilled research and technical staff with expertise in

⁴ *Id.*⁵ Letter from Congressmen John D. Dingell and Bart Stupak to President George Bush (Aug. 8, 2008) (on file with author).⁶ *Id.*⁷ Larry Margasak, *Biodefense lab looks headed to Mississippi*, S.F. CHRONICLE, August 11, 2008. This document is included as an addendum to this letter.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor’s statement. DHS notes the commentor’s position and concern for locating NBAF on the mainland. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated on the mainland. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Comment No: 3

Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the commentor’s statement. DHS has identified its Preferred Alternative in Section 2.6 of the NBAF EIS. While NEPA recommends that the Draft EIS identify the preferred alternative, it does allow the preferred alternative to be identified in the Final EIS (40 CFR 1502.14(e)).

Comment No: 4

Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor’s statements. DHS held a competitive process to select potential sites for the proposed NBAF as described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. A team of federal employees representing multi-department component offices and multi-governmental agencies (i.e., DHS, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Department of Health and Human Services) reviewed the submissions based primarily on environmental suitability and proximity to research capabilities, proximity to workforce, acquisition/construction/operations, and community acceptance. Ultimately, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed others in meeting the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences, and determined that they, in addition to the Plum Island Site, would be evaluated in the EIS as alternatives for the proposed NBAF.

Schwartz, Robert

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4 cont. | 5.0

operations conducted at biological and agricultural research facilities and be within proximity to training programs for such expertise[.]” NBAF DEIS at 2-10. Based on these criteria, “[g]overnment experts originally expressed concern that the proposed site in Flora, Miss., was far from existing biodefense research programs and lacked ready access to workers already familiar with highly contagious animal and human diseases[.]”⁸ For these reasons, the site in Flora, Mississippi was assigned “a score that ranked it 14th among 17 candidate sites in the United States.”⁹ Yet, the DHS selection authority determined that the Flora, Mississippi site “met the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences and would therefore be advanced as [one of five] reasonable alternatives to be studied in the [DEIS for the proposed NBAF].” NBAF DEIS at 2-11. This was so because a senior DHS official, Undersecretary Jay Cohen, overruled the government experts’ concerns.¹⁰

Pursuant to CEQ’s regulations, an EIS is to be “prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5. Here, it appears that the DEIS for the proposed NBAF is being used to justify the selection of the Flora, Mississippi site based on political considerations that are inappropriate for a decision of this nature and importance. As such, DHS should provide further information about the politicization of the site selection process and eliminate from consideration any sites that have benefited from the improper influence of biased public officials.

2 cont. | 21.0

Finally, there is substantial evidence that the principal research to be conducted at the proposed NBAF cannot be conducted safely on the U.S. mainland, thereby eliminating five of the six alternative sites under consideration. On May 22, 2008, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce conducted a hearing entitled “Germs, Viruses, and Secrets: Government Plans to Move Exotic Disease Research to the Mainland United States.”¹¹ Congressman Bart Stupak, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, included the following statement in his opening remarks: “For more than 50 years Foot and Mouth Disease [FMD] has been researched safely on Plum Island and moving it to the mainland would be a foolish tempting of fate that could cost countless farmers and ranchers their livelihoods and could cost billions of dollars should an FMD release occur.”¹² This statement is bolstered by a recent GAO report, which reached the following conclusion:

GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has neither conducted nor commissioned any study to determine whether work on foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) can be done safely on the U.S. mainland. Instead, in deciding that work with FMD can be done safely on the mainland, DHS relied on a 2002 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) study that addressed a different question. The study did not assess the past history of releases of FMD virus or other dangerous pathogens in the United States or elsewhere. It did not address in detail the issues of

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ A hearing webcast, witness list, and prepared testimony are available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.052208.PlumIsland.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2008).

¹² *Germs, Viruses, and Secrets: Government Plans to Move Exotic Disease Research to the Mainland United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce*, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Rep. Stupak, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations). This document is included as an addendum to this letter.

Schwartz, Robert

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WD0846

containment related to large animal work in BSL-3 Ag facilities. It was inaccurate in comparing other countries' FMD work experience with that of the United States. Therefore, GAO believes DHS does not have evidence to conclude that FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland.¹³

2 cont. 21.0 | The GAO report goes on to note that "location can help prevent the spread of pathogens and, thus, a resulting disease outbreak if there is a release."¹⁴ Since there is always some risk of a release from any biocontainment facility, "most experts GAO spoke with said that an island location can provide additional protection."¹⁵ This is so because "[a]n island location can help prevent the spread of FMD virus along terrestrial routes, such as from vehicles splashed with contaminated mud, and may also reduce airborne transmission."¹⁶ In light of this, it seems apparent that, among the six alternative sites under consideration, Plum Island may be the only suitable location. Accordingly, DHS needs to undertake further analysis to determine whether it is truly feasible to construct and operate the proposed NBAF on the U.S. mainland and what role political considerations may have played in the site selection process. If the proposed NBAF cannot be safely constructed and operated on the U.S. mainland, DHS needs to identify and study additional alternative sites, apart from the Plum Island location.

Alternatively, if the Plum Island location has drawbacks or deficiencies outside the parameters of the above discussion, those, too, must be fully disclosed and analyzed by DHS during the NEPA process for the proposed NBAF.

III. Missing information

6 | 23.0 | The NBAF DEIS fails to provide adequate information concerning the quantity of pathogenic material that will be housed in the proposed NBAF. This information is essential to informed evaluation of the potential environmental risks posed by the proposed NBAF. Moreover, such information is of vital importance in assessing the adequacy of the administrative, biocontainment, and security controls at the facility, as well as the need for additional mitigation measures. In the event of a terrorist attack or natural catastrophic event at the proposed NBAF, the pathogenic material contained therein could be released into the human environment. The magnitude of that risk may be amplified as the quantity of material in the facility increases. Accordingly, DHS must provide further information concerning the total quantity of pathogenic material that is likely to be housed in the proposed NBAF, including any limits for the facility.

IV. Connected actions

7 | 26.0 | The NBAF DEIS is inadequate because it fails to consider connected actions to the construction and operation of the proposed NBAF at one of the six alternative sites. Pursuant to CEQ's regulations, connected actions, which are those that are closely related to the proposed action, must be considered in the same EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1). Actions are connected to

¹³ GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DHS LACKS EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE RESEARCH CAN BE DONE SAFELY ON THE U.S. MAINLAND, Highlights (2008). This document is included as an addendum to this letter.

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ *Id.*

Comment No: 5

Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's statement that the NBAF should be located on an island. The NBAF EIS fully analyzes the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 6

Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

DHS notes the commentor's concern that the NBAF would be a prime terrorist target. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS address accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) (designated as For Official Use Only) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process.

Comment No: 7

Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. DHS prepared the NBAF EIS in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). The primary objective of the EIS is to evaluate the environmental impacts of the no action and site alternatives for locating, constructing and operating the NBAF. As summarized in Section 3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS analyzed each environmental resource area in a consistent manner across all the alternatives to allow for a fair comparison among the alternatives. This included those connected actions that were identified as being essential to the NBAF operation such as improvements to roads and infrastructure.

Schwartz, Robert

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WD0846

3 cont. | 5.0

8 | 27.0

the proposed action if they: (i) “[a]utomatically trigger other actions which may require [an EIS]”; (ii) [c]annot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously or simultaneously”; or “[a]re interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.” *Id.* Here, the proposed NBAF is intended to update and expand the federal government’s “facilities to study the range of foreign animal diseases that are potential threats to U.S. agriculture.” NBAF DEIS at ES-1. Much of this research is currently conducted at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) in Plum Island, NY. *Id.* According to DHS, PIADC “is nearing the end of its lifecycle.” *Id.* If the proposed NBAF is constructed and becomes operational, then PIADC will no longer be needed. As such, PIADC is likely to be decommissioned, with attendant environmental impacts related to the demolition, decontamination, and remediation of the site. Moreover, these costs have not been included in the official DHS estimate for construction of the proposed NBAF, which has already increased significantly.¹⁷ These actions—and the continued operation of PIADC in the interim—are connected to the proposed action and must be considered in the NBAF DEIS.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Marylia Kelley
Executive Director, Tri-Valley CAREs
2582 Old First Street
Livermore, CA 94551
Telephone: (925) 443-7148
Email: marylia@trivalleycares.org

Robert Schwartz
Staff Attorney, Tri-Valley CAREs
2582 Old First Street
Livermore, CA 94551
Telephone: (925) 443-7148
Email: rob@trivalleycares.org

8 cont. | 27.0

Enclosures

¹⁷ Stupak, *supra* note 12, at 2 (“The official DHS estimate is that the NBAF will cost approximately \$450 million to build. But, the Committee staff has learned that DHS engineers have already raised that estimate to between \$600 and \$750 million. Moreover, this does not include the cost of demolition, decontamination, and environmental cleanup of the existing facility if Plum Island is abandoned.”).

Comment No: 8

Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the commentor’s statement. The closing of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) is outside of the scope of the NBAF EIS. If the decision is made to close PIADC in the future, then the action would be subject to a separate NEPA evaluation.

Scifers, DVM, Scifers, DVM

Page 1 of 1

PD0100

August 19, 2008

Yes,

1|25.4; This is Dr. Scifers in [REDACTED], Kansas. I am a livestock veterinarian and I just read an
2|21.4 article where you're thinking about moving this lab to the mid U.S. Actually anywhere
in the U.S. is a big mistake. I think it's pretty ignorant to try to have diseases like foot
and mouth disease being studied right in the middle of an agricultural area that's so
3|5.0 heavily concentrated with livestock. It shouldn't be anywhere on the United States
shore....continent. It ought to be off-shore somewhere.

My phone number is [REDACTED].

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's views on risk. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen.


Comment No: 3Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Scott, Laurie

Page 1 of 1

MD0104



National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement Comment Form

Personal information is optional as this document is part of the public record and may be reproduced in its entirety in the final National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement.

Name: Laurie Scott

Title: _____

Organization: _____

Address: _____

City: _____

Comments: _____

1 | 17.2 There is enough traffic on
South Milledge Avenue and I am
sensitive to chemicals and it would
be a hazard for me to continue
2 | 9.2 to live in the area. I would like
to know what your plans are
3 | 12.2 regarding air and water
pollution controls. My mother
has COPD and is 87 yrs old. I have
depth perception problems and travel
by walking along South Milledge Ave

Laurie Scott (Continued on back for your convenience)

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 17.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern about the traffic congestion in the area of the South Milledge Avenue Site and the future impact of the NBAF operation on the area's transportation infrastructure. A discussion of the planned improvements to the area's primary transportation corridors of South Milledge Avenue and Whitehall Road to alleviate current and future traffic congestion resulting from the NBAF operation at the South Milledge Avenue site is located in Section 3.11.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. All planned improvements are per the recommendations of the Department of Transportation and the Public Works Department as of 2007.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 9.2

DHS notes the commentor's air quality concerns. The potential effects of NBAF operations on air quality are discussed in Section 3.4 of the NBAF EIS. Section 3.4.1 describes the methodology used in assessing potential air quality consequences at each site. Conservative assumptions were used to ensure the probable maximum effects were evaluated. The final design will ensure that the NBAF does not significantly affect the region's ability to meet air quality standards. Should a decision be made to build NBAF and following site selection and final design, a complete emission inventory would be developed and refined modeling performed as necessary in accordance with state-specific air quality permitting requirements. DHS would be required to comply with permit-established equipment requirements. As such, consideration and discussion of specific air pollution control devices that might be necessary would be highly speculative at this time.

Comment No: 3

Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concerns. The NBAF EIS Section 3.13.4 describes the Waste Management processes that would be used to control and dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid waste. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.7.3 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff effects. DHS would be required to comply with permit-established water quality control and monitoring requirements. As such, consideration and discussion of specific water pollution control equipment that might be necessary would be highly speculative at this time.

Sears, Larry

Page 1 of 1

WD0307

From: Larry Sears [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2008 5:29 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)

Gentlemen:

1|24.4 | I have followed with great interest the Homeland Security's process of evaluation for the potential relocation of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). In reviewing the five sites (and possible new construction nearby the existing location), the selection of the Manhattan, Kansas and Kansas State University site would be an excellent choice.

The site is at the heart of the nation and is aligned with one of the core missions of the university – that of agriculture and academic elements supportive of the core mission. In addition, Kansas State University is well known in the areas of food safety, actively being a core component of research and activities involving and supportive of the mission of Homeland Security. The grain and milling science department has an international reputation within the milling and allied industries; Manhattan is headquarters to AIB International – the American Institute of Baking which is aligned with the university from an academic standpoint.

Kansas State University is a land grant university (1863) and has an elaborate agricultural extension service throughout the state, serving farmers, grain and livestock producers and rural communities on land use. Additionally, the universities veterinary medical program is among the strongest in the nation at all levels (undergraduate, masters and Ph.D).

NISTAC, a joint enterprise of the state of Kansas, City of Manhattan and Kansas State University, is a proven commercialization center for patents and technology from within the university, donated intellectual property and is seeking new horizons for research and business assistance through the university for companies outside of the university via alignment with the Colleges of Agriculture, Business and Engineering in particular.

All of the above elements are in place and are functional – the key component to all is the "can do" approach to strategic alliances both within the university and in combination with other governmental units and agencies from the municipal to the federal levels. These alignments are critical to the long term success of a venture of the type being considered by NBAF, and do not require new pathways to be constructed – they are already proven, in place and operating.

1 cont. | Recommendation is made for the relocation of NBAF to Manhattan, Kansas and its alignment with Kansas State
24.4 | University.

Regards,
Larry Sears
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Seaton, Edward

Page 1 of 3

WD0619

From: Edward Seaton [eseaton@themercury.com]
Sent: Saturday, August 23, 2008 2:08 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in Kansas

Dear Program Manager:

1/24.4 | As owner of The Manhattan Mercury, the area's daily newspaper, I have carefully examined the pros and cons of bringing the facility to our university city here in Kansas, and have concluded that on balance it is well worth whatever small risks exist.

On August 20 The Mercury published the following editorial, which may be of use to you in weighing the environment here:

"NBAF's opponents"

2cont. | 27.0

At the eleventh hour, a local group is attempting to raise safety concerns regarding the possible operation of the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility here. Its immediate goal is to mobilize opposition to the Manhattan bid in advance of Monday's deadline for filing public comment. But nothing that was expressed during an organizational meeting Tuesday suggests a dimension to these concerns beyond what has been previously expressed here or elsewhere. And a fair amount of what was expressed amounted to the spreading of outright inaccuracy.

Opponents have a kernel of legitimate argument in the finding by the Government Accountability Office that the Department of Homeland Security has not

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

Seaton, Edward**Page 2 of 3**

WD0619

2Cont.|27.0

established that such a facility can be safely operated on the mainland. (The NBAF will replace an older and less secure facility situated on Plum Island off the coast of New York.)

2Cont.|27.0

Indeed, DHS has not defined what it means by the term "safe" in the context of the NBAF. It has preferred to point to the ongoing operations of other level 4 facilities - the CDC lab in Atlanta, a lab at Fort Detrick, Md., another in San Antonio - for illustrations of "safe" operation. That strikes us as adequate, but reasonable people could certainly differ as to whether it actually is a sufficient burden of proof.

2Cont.|27.0

Where opponents have tended - here and elsewhere - to drive their truck off the rhetorical pier has been to extrapolate that because GAO faults DHS, therefore accidents with disastrous economic consequences are essentially inevitable. Their remedy is to apply a "fail-safe" operational threshold that is logically unattainable. By the standard its opponents would apply to the NBAF, the U.S. not only wouldn't build the lab, we wouldn't build the roads leading to the lab because somebody might drive carelessly on them and cause irreparable harm to themselves or others.

2Cont.|27.0

More reasonable people recognize a risk-reward standard that implies a high but attainable degree of confidence in the lab's safe operation. Several arguments are persuasive in this respect, among them that the people most logically at risk - the scientists

Seaton, Edward

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WD0619

2Cont.127.0

themselves - are comfortable working and living there.
Beyond that, the mitigation steps taken in other level 4
facilities - and which will be taken at the NBAF - come
powerfully into play.

Sincerely,

Edward Seaton
Editor in Chief
The Manhattan Mercury

Sebelius, Kathleen

Page 1 of 1



August 20, 2008

Adm. Jay M. Cohen
Under Secretary for Science and Technology
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Under Secretary Cohen:

Where can the Department of Homeland Security hit the ground running on Day 1 when you select the location for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility? The answer is clear: only in Kansas.

No other site has the combination of advantages Kansas offers to meet the very criteria DHS articulated at the outset. We provide close proximity to relevant research and existing infrastructure; an unbeatable workforce with relevant expertise; strong private and public support; and a significant cost-share offer that demonstrates our deep commitment.

We have been the guardians of America's dinner table for decades. Producing safe, high-quality food is central to our economy and livelihoods, so we are highly motivated to ensure that the absolute best agriculture products in the world come from Kansas. We understand the mission.

We associate ourselves with the comments provided by the Kansas Bioscience Authority and respectfully ask you to consider them seriously as you prepare the final EIS and your record of decision. And we most heartily encourage you to build the NBAF where its mission can be achieved most quickly and most cost effectively. On the merits, that place is Kansas.

Sincerely yours,

Kathleen Sebelius
Governor

Mark Parkinson
Lieutenant Governor
Co-chairman, NBAF in Kansas Task Force

Capitol Building, Room 212S, Topeka, KS 66612-1590 • (785) 296-3232 • Fax: (785) 296-7973
e-mail: governor@ks.gov

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the Governor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Seekins, Richard

Page 1 of 2

WD0399

From: Rick Seekins [rseekins@kerrtarco.org]
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 10:10 AM
To: nbafprogrammanager
Subject: NBAF Butner Site

1|24.3 | I am writing to express my unqualified support for the National Bio and Agri-Defense Facility (NBAF). In my role as a regional leader and facilitator of community and economic development, I speak regularly with a wide spectrum of people from an equally wide range of fields. Since our region defines preservation of the resources of the region (which includes Granville County and Butner) as a high economic development priority, I talk regularly with not only those groups that are interested in development in the region and in the state, but also those people and groups that have a strong dedication to assuring that the resources of the region are managed and maintained in a sustainable manner. Environmentally responsible development is a watchword of this part of the state, and virtually all of our residents believe in that philosophy. Those residents also support NBAF.

I have discussed the NBAF proposal with people all over the region, both in and out of our five-county area, and there is a very strong sentiment in favor of having the facility located in Butner. The people that your staff have encountered in public meetings in this area are a vocal but miniscule portion of our population. Please consider them as not representing the opinions of our region.

2|15.3 | The opposing arguments have been ridiculous in most ways. The idea of a high-tech terrorist attack on NBAF has little basis in fact. If a terrorist is interested in spreading most of the diseases being researched in NBAF, all they need to do is walk in an area of contamination, then travel to the US and walk around in a field here. Such 'low-tech' and low cost alternatives make an attack very unlikely. Newly-raised concerns about the health and safety of the near-by 'special needs' residents of the area are equally unfounded because of strategies and plans already in place to protect those people. Such emotional, but unfounded, attacks on NBAF make headlines and are effective at first hearing, but melt away in the light of factual information that proves those arguments to be baseless.

Another point that needs to be recognized is the apparent lack of participation of those in favor of the NBAF proposal. The small band of opponents are very vocal and aggressive in their opposition, and they are willing to assail any supporter of the proposal anywhere, anytime. Because their opposition is not rational or based in fact, interactions with the opponents are usually frustrating and fruitless. More than that, their verbal assaults bring enough verbal abuse that many supporters of NBAF continue their support, but are not willing to speak publically for fear of the abuse they will take from the opponents. I myself planned to speak in favor of the proposal at the recent hearing on the NBAF EIS, but was verbally attacked both outside and inside the building as I entered, and decided not to speak. Now, as I hear more and more people being intimidated by the opponents, I find it more necessary than ever to voice my support for the project.

1 cont.,
24.3 | In conclusion, I hope that your organization will recognize that the people of Butner, Granville County, the five-county Kerr-Tar Region, the 13-county Research Triangle Regional partnership region, and all of North Carolina supports NBAF and wants to see it here in the future.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.3

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held scoping meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives. A site-specific emergency response plan would be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan and individual facility plans regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF, and which would include stipulations for all special-needs populations.

Seekins, Richard

Page 2 of 2

WD0399

If you have any questions about my position or need additional information, I am available at any time.

Rick Seekins
Community and Economic Development Director
Kerr-Tar Regional Council of Governments
(252) 436-2049 - Office
(252) 432-7972 - Cell
rseekins@kerrtarcog.org

Seekins, Rick**Page 1 of 1**

PD0121

August 20, 2008

Hi,

My name is Rick Seekins, and I live in [REDACTED] adjacent to Granville County. I work in this region and I talk with an awful lot of folks involved in economic development and especially involved in the ideas and reviews of the NBAF project - all of those people. And I have spoken to every single one of them is in favor of this project. They feel that the EIS was done legitimately in terms of following all the standard formats for EIS preparation and that it was done fairly and equitably and everybody seems very pleased with the process of the project and are still looking forward to having NBAF here in our region.

The small but vocal minority that has had its chance to speak over and over again, does not represent the opinions of this region. And I just want to offer my comments that indicate that that is not the case. They do not speak for me, and they don't speak for any of the other folks that I've talked to who have been involved in this project.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.3

DHS notes the commentator's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Seidler, Richard

Page 1 of 1

WD0828

From: Rich Seidler [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 6:41 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Manhattan Kansas Site

To whom it may concern:

1| 5.4 Unlike most people writing letters for or against this project, I will admit I do not know if Manhattan is the best location for the facility. I have faith that the criteria used to make the selection will be carefully weighed so that the best site will be selected for all the best reasons. On the surface it appears to me that Manhattan certainly should rank high on the list.

My point in writing is to urge you to use good data to make your decision. As a former Mayor of Manhattan, I am aware that a very vocal minority can make claims and accusations at the very last minute on an issue, making it sound like they have not only facts, but consensus as well, on their side. While I defend the right of any group to voice either their support or opposition to an issue, I'm always hopeful those listening will take into account good data when making their final decision, and leave politics out of the equation.

2| 24.4 Based on my information, it appears that Manhattan is a good fit. Please consider all opinions and input, but make your decision based on facts.

Sincerely,

Richard W. Seidler
[REDACTED]Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative. Several factors will affect the decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where. The EIS itself will not be the sole deciding factor. The decision will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS and support documents; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in section 2.3.1; 3) applicable Federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Seitter, David

Page 1 of 1

WD0414

From: Seitter, David C. [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 2:26 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager

1|24.4 | As a resident of the State of Kansas, I believe the NBAF belongs in Kansas on the merits due to our state's unique infrastructure, commitment and ability to protect America's valuable food supply and agrarian economy.

David C. Seitter
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Sheats, A.**Page 1 of 1**

PD0330

August 25, 2008

Hello there.

This is Mr. Sheats, A. Sheats, [REDACTED].

1| 24.2

I would just like to say that I support the development of the site here in Athens.

I think the NBAF program would be an asset economically to the area for the blue collar jobs that it might bring to the area....that it will bring to the area, because I know that there will be maintenance jobs, as well as general environmental service positions within the facility. And those positions would pay well and help to remove some of the....help to reduce quite a number of the poverty here in Athens, Clark County.

And I would think that it'd be some feeder programs to go along with that, or feeder organizations to go along with the NBAF program.

And I guess that's enough for now. For the most part I support the operation coming to Athens and hope that it does so.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Shelor, Greg

Page 1 of 2

WD0677

From: Gregory Shelor [gregory2000@fairpoint.net]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 9:16 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Comments for National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility

1|24.4 I would like to express my support for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility to be built in
Manhattan Kansas. As an agriculture leader in Kansas I know the safety and security of our
food supply is vital to our public health and the strength of the economy. Because of its
2|1.4 agricultural heritage and expertise, Kansas fully understands why the NBAF must be built for the
nation. We cannot delay in identifying new ways to prevent and treat diseases in order to protect
the American food supply and agriculture economy.
3|8.4 Kansas is the world's leader in animal health and commodity research with a unique
concentration of both academic and industrial assets. It is home to numerous private agricultural
assets, research facilities, specialists, and academic institutions. Kansas State University has
internationally recognized expertise in zoonotic diseases, infectious diseases, and livestock
medicine. This expertise led to the creation of the Biosecurity Research Institute and the
National Agricultural Biosecurity Center at K-State. This location would also be part of the
Kansas City Animal Health Corridor, which is home to more than 120 animal health companies.
The NBAF would benefit from the expertise within the biosciences corridor that includes the
Kansas City Area Life Sciences Institute, Midwest Research Institute, the Stowers Institute for
Medical Research, and the University of Kansas Medical Center.
With agriculture being one of the major industries in Kansas and its continued wellbeing, it only
make since that the location for the NABF be in Manhattan, KS.

Thanks, Greg

Greg Shelor, President
Kansas Grain Sorghum Producers Association
11421 Yucca Rd
Minneola, KS 67865

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's support for the NBAF the Manhattan Campus Site.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

Shelor, Greg

Page 2 of 2

E-mail message checked by Spyware Doctor (5.5.1.322)
Database version: 5.10540e
<http://www.pctools.com/spyware-doctor/>

8/25/2008

Shelton, Wendy

Page 1 of 1

WD0213

From: Wendy Shelton [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 08, 2005 11:43 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Public Comment NBAF project

To Whom it May Concern:

1|24.5

Please consider this comment in support of the NBAF facility locating in Flora, Mississippi.

My children attend school in Flora, Mississippi. I am an attorney with an office [REDACTED] I am also the Executive Director [REDACTED] I realize that you would expect my comment to be in support of locating the facility in Flora since I am the Executive Director of the FACC. However, my most important job is that of a parent of four. In that capacity, I request that you locate this facility in Flora, Mississippi. I want Mississippi's children to have every opportunity this facility might present. Anything that could positively impact education in our state is welcome.

2|15.5

Economically, Flora needs this facility.

1 cont.|
24.5

I have read the EIS summary and am not concerned that this facility would present an unacceptable risk to our health, safety or welfare.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Wendy Shelton
[REDACTED]Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative. The economic effects of the NBAF at the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative are included in Section 3.10.5 of the NBAF EIS.

Shepard, Becky

Page 1 of 1

WD0483

From: Becky Shepard [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 12:13 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Support NBAF in Kansas

1| 24.4

I support NBAF in Kansas.

Kansas is uniquely qualified to conduct this research because of our long-standing expertise in human and veterinary medicine and the biosciences.

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.